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Art and Politics in the Systemprogramme 
 
Philip A Quadrio 
 
Introduction 
 
I have divided this paper into three sections: the first and shortest 
section is a preamble; in the second section, which primarily 
concerns political philosophy and Rousseau’s influence on 
Idealist thought, and in which I explore a little of the intellectual 
history that I think provides an important backdrop for the issues 
explored in the third and longest section, in which we will take up 
issues relating to the intersection of political and aesthetical 
thought through an engagement with a rather enigmatic Idealist 
text that has come to be known as the Systemprogramme.  
 
Preamble 
 
It is appropriate to say a few words about the text that forms the 
focus of the latter part of the presentation, which is a text that is 
not well known outside of Idealist scholarship. The text, which, 
according to custom, I shall refer to as the Systemprogramme, is 
a fragmentary piece of disputed authorship that dates from 
around 1796. I shall treat the text as if Hegel were the author but, 
I am willing to confess, this contention is open to question. In 
regard to the issue of authorship this paper is a significant 
departure from my previous engagements with the text.1  Where I 
was once inclined to interpret the text through the lens of 
Schellingian thought, here the text is refracted through a 
Hegelian lens as I am now of the opinion that it was indeed 
Hegel and not Schelling or Holderlin who authored the text. 
Whilst I have a fairly good argument for why I believe this to be 
                                                
1 P Quadrio, ‘The Oldest Systemprogramme of German Idealism,’ in Cogito: 
Journal of Philosophy, 2001, Vol 2 (1). 
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the case, which I have made in a separate paper, I will not be 
making it here.2   
 
Secondly, in regard to the relationship between the 
Systemprogramme and Idealist thought in general, I have a 
further confession to make, and that is that the 
Systemprogramme does not play a huge role in the history of 
Idealism. The course of Idealist thought would probably have 
remained the same without it. It passed into obscurity almost 
immediately after it was written, and only re-emerged in the late 
nineteenth century. It has however generated a lot of interest 
amongst scholars of classical German philosophy and it now 
seems almost customary for Idealist scholars to offer some 
comment on it. There are many reasons why this is the case but 
for the purposes of this presentation let me indicate three of 
these: it presents an interesting interpretive problem, as 
understanding the text is half the fun of engaging with it, it raises 
some fascinating ideas relating to the politically educative uses 
of art or more particularly poetry, and finally, if Hegel is the 
author, it gives some insight into the course of his intellectual 
development.  
 
In this paper the primary aim is to consider what the text says 
about the relationship of art and politics, although along the way 
we will also have to engage in some difficult hermeneutic work, 
and hopefully the paper will be able to shed some light on early 
Hegelian thought. In this regard it is important to make it clear 
from the outset that Hegel’s thought during this period has a 
different focus and feel than the work of his latter period. To get 
some perspective here, in 1796 Hegel is about twenty-six years 
old and his first major publication, the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
will not be published for another eleven years, and even this 
work is not often considered to be the mature Hegelian view. So 
the Hegel we are dealing with is quite different from the Hegel 
that some of us know; his interest here is not so much in creating 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
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a systematic theoretical philosophy, even though the text does 
seem to offer a program for such a system, but rather Hegel in 
this period seems to be more concerned with rational social 
reform. In any case, whilst the work of the early Hegel seems to 
pursue a different agenda from the latter Hegel, the work of the 
early Hegel has long been recognised as a very fruitful field, 
especially for those interested in the development of Hegel’s 
socio-political thought. 
 
Lastly, I explicitly make a point about the Systemprogramme that 
is implicit throughout the paper and serves as a kind of 
hermeneutic framework for what follows. I take it that in regard to 
what the text has to say about the intersection of politics and 
aesthetics, its focus is on the political problem of the relation 
between freedom, obligation and authority. The text seeks to 
reconcile freedom with the political obligation and political 
authority that is fundamental to life in a modern state. The text is 
based in the notion that freedom is compatible with the kind of 
constraints that are placed upon us by our political associations 
so long as those constraints are constraints that we can 
rationally endorse. In the most general terms the text seems to 
be based in a republican concept of freedom, that we are free 
when we live by laws of our own making. 
  
Background 
 
The background I wish to paint here, although somewhat 
crudely, is one that attempts to draw out the importance of 
Rousseau for the political thought of the German Idealists. There 
are three main points that I seek to make. Firstly, I will claim that 
Rousseau’s notion of the general will is received into Idealist 
thought as an organic theory of the state. Secondly, I will argue 
that Rousseau’s philosophy was a fundamental motivation for 
Kant’s critical turn (effectively Rousseau turns Kant away from 
metaphysics and towards practical ends) and particularly the 
actualisation of freedom through rational reform. Thirdly, that 
Rousseau almost pre-empts what has come to be known as the 
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theory versus practice debate and that this pre-emption seems to 
leave its mark on this text, the Systemprogramme. As I have said 
above, this section is highly compressed and so in making these 
points I am merely offering the outlines of longer arguments. 
 
For Rousseau a system of civil obligations can be reconciled with 
human freedom and equality if each member identifies their will 
with one that is completely general.3  By identifying one’s will with 
a general will the authority of that will becomes one’s own 
authority; therefore, in acting according to that authority one acts 
as one wills. This identification of the individual will with one that 
is completely general constitutes the state as ‘a “moral person,” 
an organic civil whole.’4 This organic state is a notion that 
becomes fundamental to political Idealism, especially in the work 
of Fichte and Hegel, and so needs explanation.  
 
The best way to come to terms with the organic conception of the 
state, as it was understood by the Idealist, is to juxtapose it with 
a contrasting conception of the state, the mechanical state or the 
machine state; this takes us to Hobbes. For Hobbes the civic 
body is a product of consent, and sovereign authority is derived 
from this consent.5  But, once established, the relation of the 
sovereign to the whole can be viewed as analogous to that 
between the body and soul, whereby the body was something 
mechanical and the soul a separate substance governing its 
motion.6  The soul animated the body just as the sovereign 
animated the civic body; here we have what I will call a socio-
political duality of substance. What is important here is that 
sovereignty is something that is external to the civic body; once 
sovereignty has been established these two terms are isolatable 
                                                
3 J J Rousseau, The Social Contract, translated by M Cranston, 
Hammondsworth, 1968, 61-3. 
4 S Meld Shell, ‘Organizing the State. Transformations of the Body Politic in 
Rousseau, Kant and Fichte,’ in International Yearbook of German Idealism, K 
Ameriks and J Stolzenberg, editors, Berlin, 2004, 50. 
5 T Hobbes, Leviathan, R Tuck, editor, Cambridge, 1996, 117-121. 
6 Meld Shell, op cit, 54-5. 
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and distinct.7  Whilst sovereignty emerged from the consent of 
the civic body once it is established it is free from its dependence 
upon that body, in fact any relation of dependence flows in the 
other direction, and it seems that the civic body is to a large 
degree dependent on the sovereign for its motive force and 
coherence. In such a conception, sovereignty is not immanent 
within the civic body, but rather it lies outside of it.8 
 
For Rousseau, on the other hand, the civic body was understood 
by analogy with organic life, or perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that it was understood by analogy with the moral 
person.9  The civic body, qua moral person, contains within it its 
own principle of life and movement. This principle is completely 
internal to that moral person without becoming a separate ruling 
part. The state is a living whole ‘whose unifying general will is 
immanent and consistent with freedom and equality.’10 This we 
could construe as a form of socio-political monism. This 
Rousseauian idea passes into the Idealist tradition but is 
radically transformed in transit, so that by the time Hegel takes 
up the notion of an organic state, the notion of organicism is not 
so much based on an analogy but rather it is based on Hegel’s 
logic, it has become a logical category. This is a complex story 
the exact details of which we will have to leave aside, although 
we will take up the notion of organicism as a logical category 
later and thereby develop more nuanced understanding of the 
organic state. 
 
Scholars like Richard Velkley11 and Friedrich Beiser12 admirably 
bring out a more direct Rousseauian influence on Idealist 
                                                
7 T Hobbes, op cit, 121-2. 
8 Ibid, 120-121. 
9 Meld Shell, op cit, 56. 
10 Ibid. 
11 R L Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of 
Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Chicago, 1989. 
12 F C Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: the genesis of 
modern German political thought, 1790-1800, Cambridge,1992. 
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thought. This second dimension lies in Rousseau’s influence on 
Kant; Rousseau was able to convince Kant that metaphysics 
undermines practical morality, that its concern with transcendent 
entities was useless in the sphere of practical life.13  Rather than 
base morality on metaphysics, it would be more appropriate to 
base metaphysics on morality.14  The key end was freedom, and 
could only be achieved via the realisation of human rights, which, 
for Kant, could only flourish in a Republican society based on 
equality. Hence, a specific set of socio-political conditions 
become, for Kant, the transcendental ground of freedom.15  So, 
with Beiser, I understand the primacy of practical reason in Kant 
to be a product of his encounter with the thought of Rousseau.  
 
The primacy of the practical in Kant is basically an expression of 
the notion that the end or telos of reason was a practical one, the 
telos of reason was human freedom.16 For Kant the practical goal 
was, through the application of reason, to transform the mere 
mechanical rule of the patriarchal sovereign (the state 
understood along Hobbesian lines) into a social organism that 
embodied the spirit of reciprocal freedom,17 which we might 
interpret as something like Rousseau’s General Will. Kant was 
operating with an agenda of rational political reform. Reason 
could guide our political life and lead us to a reconciliation of 
freedom, obligation and authority and to that degree reason itself 
had a practical authority. So whilst the powers of reason had 
limits and were indeed bounded, reason did extend as far as was 
practically necessary for life. 
 
But Kant’s optimism was not shared by all of his contemporaries. 
For conservative thinkers one event more than any other, the 
French Revolution, served as the most forceful indictment of 
                                                
13 Ibid, 29. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, 30. 
16 Velkley, op cit, 39-40. 
17 Ibid, 61-62.  
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reason’s practical authority.18  It seemed for them that practical 
reason had all the blood of the guillotine on its hands and that 
the rational reform of politics actually undermined political 
authority;19 political theory was undermining political reality. For 
the conservatives, the principles of morality were only derivable 
experientially, and wholesale reform led to anarchy.20  Such 
criticisms of political rationalism fed into the now famous ‘theory 
versus practice debate:’21 for the conservatives, theory ought to 
follow practice, whereas for the radicals practice ought to 
conform to theory. The theory versus practice debate had a 
decisive impact upon European thinkers from Kant through 
Hegel to Marx and beyond. This debate was framed around two 
questions: firstly, does reason have the power to determine the 
first principles of the state?22 Secondly, does it have the authority 
to make people act on those principles?23  For the conservatives, 
even if one answers the first question affirmatively, and they held 
some doubt about this, the second question must be answered in 
the negative; pure reason does not have practical power, it 
cannot motivate a person towards their duty. The wellsprings of 
popular political action were the passions, imagination and 
tradition,24 which are untouched by the philosophical abstraction 
typical of the rational reformers.  
 
The challenge to those philosophers, like Kant, who were 
optimistic about the authority of practical reason was to show 
that reason could be practical, that theory could guide practice. 
Against this conservative position other thinkers believed that 
rational political reform was possible; their answer to the first 
question was affirmative. Reason could determine the principles 
                                                
18 F Beiser in A companion to continental Philosophy, S Critchley and W R 
Schroeder, editors, Oxford, 1999, 24. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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of state, theory could guide practice, philosophy can tell us how 
we ought to live. Yet the arguments of the conservatives were 
not lost on them; they took seriously the claim that the passions, 
imagination and tradition were the wellsprings of popular political 
action and that reason was not suited to appeal to poorly 
educated unenlightened people. The problem was to transform 
abstract ideas, well-suited to a philosophical temperament, into a 
source of motivation, and inspiration, for popular political action. 
For many the problem became a problem about presentation and 
education. The challenge that had to be met was to find some 
vehicle whereby philosophical discourse could be presented to a 
non-philosophical audience and through this achieve a kind of 
general philosophical education which would facilitate practical 
reform. An uneducated public had to undergo some kind of 
educative process whereby they would be able to achieve a 
rational perspective on social and political problems.  
 
For those philosophers who followed Kant, and here I am 
particularly thinking not only of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, but 
also of the Early Romantics, there was a feeling that a new age 
was dawning. They dreamt of a completed philosophy, a 
completed science, and with that completed science a perfect 
theory of the state. Yet, the issues that animated the theory 
versus practice debate indicated that such a perfect theory, 
whilst theoretically possible, might not be practically achievable. 
This end appeared unachievable simply in virtue of the fact that 
the public seemed to lack the enlightenment required to be 
motivated by reason or what they perceived as rational. 
 
Now, as I stated earlier, I want to claim that Rousseau had 
already grasped this problem so let me return to Rousseau 
briefly. One idea linked to Rousseau’s concept of a body politic 
constituted by reciprocal connectedness was the need for a unity 
of sensibility, the need for an emotional bond, as a kind of 
transcendental condition or ground for such a body politic.25  This 
                                                
25 Meld Shell, op cit, 59. 
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held the body politic together as a moral being and without it the 
body politic would fall apart, disintegrate. The general will is, in 
fact, an expression of this connectedness, the general will forges 
this connectedness into a tangible political agency. So in an 
important sense the general will arises out of some prior 
emotional bond or is a modification of it.26  Whilst a general will 
could theoretically be achieved through the rational construction 
of institutions, for Rousseau the most adequate means to this 
end is through creating shared values, shared ‘habits of the 
heart’ which bring about a sentimental connection to the social 
whole.27  So for Rousseau in order for practice to follow theory 
there is a need to have a way of appealing to sensibility.  
 
One vehicle through which this appeal could be made was the 
civic religion. Here religion becomes a vehicle of reciprocal 
connectedness because of its affective power and not because 
of its content.28  It is through affect that the spirit of reciprocal 
connectedness is forged and the general will can manifest to 
produce a reconciliation of freedom and obligation. It is not the 
doctrinal components of religion that interest Rousseau, rather its 
capacity to create bonds of affect within a community and to fill 
abstract legalism with passion by embedding it in an affective 
social practice. Religion does not dictate to reason what it ought 
to think, but rather reason leads religious practice towards 
rational social ends. Rousseau pre-empts the conservative 
critique encountered in the theory versus practice debate by 
tacitly acknowledging that unaided reason, pure abstract 
legalism, is insufficient to achieve civic health. It is not sufficient 
to know the good but rather the people must undergo an 
experience which creates an affective bond with the good. 
Reason is powerful but affect is even more so in the realm of 
popular political action. Indeed it is only through affect that a 
bond can be made between the people and the rational. 
                                                
26 Ibid, 58. 
27 Ibid, 59. 
28 J H Dent, editor, A Rousseau Dictionary, Oxford, 1992, 204. 
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This is the general background that we need to have in view in 
order to work through what I want to say about the 
Systemprogramme. Before we move onto section three, where 
we will directly engage with the text, it would be appropriate to 
take a short Hegelian interlude. In order to gain a sense of the 
text’s flavour, its bold pronouncements and its almost sermon 
like quality, consider the following abstract (taken from the Bowie 
translation): 
 
Putting the Idea of Humanity first – I want to show that there is 
no Idea of the State because the state is something 
mechanical, just as little as there is an idea of a machine. 
 
Only that which is an object of freedom is called an Idea. We 
must, then, also go beyond the state! – For every state must 
treat free people as a piece of machinery; and it should not do 
this: thus it must come to an end… 
 
Finally the Idea which unites all, the idea of beauty…the 
highest act of reason…is an aesthetic act…The philosopher 
must possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet. People 
without aesthetic power are our pedantic philosophers 
[BuchstabenPhilosophen]. The philosophy of spirit is an 
aesthetic philosophy…   
 
Poetry thereby gains a higher dignity, at the end it becomes 
what it was in the beginning – teacher of (History) Mankind; for 
there is no philosophy, no history any more, poetry alone will 
survive all the remaining sciences and arts. 
 
…we hear so often that the masses should have a sensuous 
religion. Not only the masses but also the philosopher needs 
monotheism of reason of the heart, polytheism of imagination 
and of art, this is what we need! 
 
…I shall speak here of an Idea which, as far as I know, has 
never occurred to anyone –  we must have a new mythology, 
but this mythology must be in the service of the Ideas [of 
reason], it must become a mythology of reason. 
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Before we make the Ideas [of reason] aesthetic i.e. 
mythological, they are of no interest to the people and on the 
other hand before mythology is reasonable the philosopher 
must be ashamed of it. Thus enlightened and unenlightened 
must finally shake hands, mythology must become 
philosophical and the people reasonable, and philosophy must 
become mythological in order to make the philosophers 
sensuous. Then eternal unity will reign among us. Never the 
despising gaze, never the blind trembling of the people before 
its wise men and priests. Only then can we expect the same 
development of all powers, of the individual as well as all 
individuals [equality]. No power will be suppressed any more, 
then general freedom and equality of spirits will reign!… it will 
be the last greatest work of mankind.29 
 
Comments on the Text 
 
The Systemprogramme overcomes the gap between theory and 
practice in a way resonant with Rousseau’s civic religion. The 
Systemprogramme is a naïve, but beautiful, revolutionary dream 
that a philosophically inspired reform of religion could be the 
great agency of popular enlightenment, overcoming the gap 
between theory and practice, reconciling freedom with political 
obligation,30 forging an organic social form united in reciprocal 
connectedness. It is not doctrinal Christianity that provides the 
model of reform but rather it is the aesthetic religion of the 
Greeks.31  Christianity is hostile to myth and imagination: hence it 
is practically useless for uniting the people.32  The superiority of 
Greek religion lies not in any of its metaphysical doctrine but in 
its form, the Greek religion is aesthetic, its power is its 
                                                
29 Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche, 
Manchester, 1993, 265-67. 
30 H S Harris, ‘Religion as the Mythology of Reason,’ in, Thought, 1981, Vol 56, 
(222), 302. 
31 Ibid. 
32 H S Harris, Hegel’s Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801, Oxford, 
1972, 254-255. 
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mythological or poetic character.33  The content of the new 
religion is not to be found in the sphere of the religious, but rather 
it is to be found solely in practical reason.34  So, whilst the 
aesthetic mythology of the Greeks provides the form of this 
religious reform, Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason grounds its 
content.  
 
Here we have swiftly emptied religion of all metaphysical content 
and turned it into a vehicle through which practical reason can 
become an active social force; Nietzsche’s quip about 
Christianity being Platonism for the masses comes to mind. Let 
us now consider what the text itself tells us. In the part of the text 
which most interests me we are told that the Idea of humanity 
cannot provide us with an Idea of the state and this is so 
because the state is something mechanical whereas humanity is 
a living organic ideal.35  Here the thought is that mechanism and 
organicism are mutually exclusive modes of understanding, 
which is a notion we have briefly sketched out earlier. The main 
clue to the interpretation of this passage lies, however, in the first 
line of the next paragraph, which states that only an object of 
freedom is called an Idea.36  An Idea is an object of freedom in 
that it is an actualisation of its own concept. Idea and concept 
are both used in their special Hegelian sense. Here we must 
understand concept as a causative principle, a blueprint 
embedded in some self-developing unity. We might understand 
concept as the concept of an end, a telos.37  The Idea is a unity 
that has developed teleologically towards an end that is 
embedded within it – it is self-determining. More concretely we 
might say that the Idea contains within itself its own 
developmental principle (the concept) and as such is the cause 
of itself, or at least is more the result of its own inner 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Harris, ‘Religion as the Mythology’, op cit, 302. 
35 Harris, Hegel’s Development, op cit, 250. 
36 G W F Hegel, Systemprogramme, translated by Harris in Ibid, 510.  
37 M Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford, 1999, 60. 
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determination than the result of anything external to it.38 The Idea 
is the actualisation of its own concept; the idea is to the concept 
as the mature tree is to the seed. Again, I would emphasise the 
teleological nature of this development. The Idea is an object of 
freedom in that it is relatively independent of influences outside 
of its own nature for its existence, just as the seed contains the 
germ of the mature tree.  
 
For Hegel, the organism, qua logical category, can only be 
understood through the concept of a system of parts that are in a 
relation of reciprocal connectedness, through a notion of a life 
whose principle of growth and development is internal to it. In 
other words, the organic is a unity that contains within it its own 
concept, or that contains within it its own internal principle of 
development and its possibility does not require any reference to 
an external will or a creator. Hence there can be an idea of an 
organism, because organism is a concept, a self-developing 
unity: organism contains the ground of its own determination. 
That is the logical definition of an organism. With mechanism, 
however, we have a relation of parts in juxtaposition to one 
another. The function of each part in relation to the whole is 
something that is determined externally: by a creator or controller 
who sets the parts in such a relation so as to achieve some end. 
Such an end is, of course, always external to it and is never part 
of its own inner purpose and so one must always go beyond the 
mechanism in order to explain it. A mechanism is an artifice, 
something constructed and so is ontologically reliant upon an 
artificer. It is not self-sufficient and thus it is dependent and 
unfree. 
 
So, with the mechanism its concept always lies in a will external 
to it and in order to explain the existence of the mechanism one 
has to refer to some external will. The mechanism requires the 
mechanic or engineer. It is other determined. The organism, 
containing within itself its own principle of growth and 
                                                
38 Ibid.  
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development, its own ends or purpose, is therefore self-sufficient 
and so is an object of freedom, but the machine, which has its 
purpose or end determined by an external will cannot be 
understood as an object of freedom. The state, like the machine, 
is an instrument, it is set up; it is an arrangement of interacting 
‘objects’ that is set up by a will external to it. Those who set up 
the state are like political mechanics or political engineers. 
Therefore, whilst both the state and the machine can operate 
with causal efficacy they also, in their reliance on an external will, 
demonstrate a passivity and dependence alien to the organism, 
which does not need refer to an external will. They require for 
their very existence, for their very possibility, another causal 
power, a power that serves to actualise a concept of the 
instrument. Hence the concept, or telos, of mechanism always 
lies outside of itself, whereas the concept of telos of the 
organism is always contained within it.  
 
Remember, an Idea represents a fully actualised concept, and a 
concept is something that is self-actualising or contains its ends 
within itself. If the state is mechanical, it is not an object of 
freedom: it is a system tuned towards ends external to it. Thus 
there can be no Idea of the state in the same way that there can 
be no idea of a machine.39 Both are conditioned, neither 
actualises its own concept. For Hegel there is an idea of 
humanity; humanity is a self-determining, self-sufficient concept 
and hence an object of freedom. In this, we encounter the notion 
that the state, as an instrument, and an instrument of a sovereign 
that is in effect separate from or external to it, has subordinated 
that which is unconditioned and free to itself. Something unfree, 
the machine state, subordinates something free, the people that 
comprise it. Freedom is subsumed by the apparatus that ought to 
serve it. An absurdity! This must come to an end!  The machine 
state, qua mechanism, inevitably treats free people as if they 
were cogs, mere instruments in the service of its ends - thus 
                                                
39 Hegel, Systemprogramme, op cit, 510. 
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negating rather than actualising human freedom.40  The state 
must go!  We have been led to anarchism.  
 
The spirit of revolution is a strong voice in the text,  but this is 
mitigated. It is not the state per se that must go, but the 
patriarchal machine state. Once the machine state is dissolved, 
what is required is not the further full dissolution of the state but 
rather that thought go beyond the state.41  The machine state 
cannot forge an ethical community nor can it inspire morality, it 
can only pursue abstract legality, it can only operate in the spirit 
of positivism, according to laws applied in abstraction. The 
ethical society, on the other hand, is one bound in the spirit of 
reciprocal connectedness, the organic whole. Ethical society is 
an object of freedom. It is not something constructed, but rather 
is self-actualising, because ethical society, qua society bound in 
the spirit of reciprocal freedom, is a moral person. Whilst the Idea 
of humanity cannot provide an idea of the state, because the 
state is constructed by humanity, the Idea of humanity can 
provide us with the idea of the ethical society, for the ethical 
society is an analogue of the moral person.  
 
The machine state is a product of what Hegel refers to as 
Verstand, abstract understanding. This is a piece of Hegelian 
terminology that I ought to explain. Verstand is a mode of 
thinking that analyses and dissects what it relates to, breaking 
the world down into definite particulars, abstracting those 
particulars from their concrete relations to other particulars or 
from the wholes in which they are embedded.42 These particulars 
are then defined and these definitions held fixed by the 
understanding. For Hegel this is an essential, but ultimately one-
sided and inadequate mode of thinking. The Machine State is a 
product of Verstand, it is the product of a process of abstraction 
that brings isolated and isolatable but clearly defined particulars 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Inwood, op cit, 243-244. 
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into some kind of contingent relation to achieve a contingent end. 
Like a machine, it is a product of human design, assembled out 
of isolated particulars with an end in mind. It can only treat 
people from the aspect of the abstract understanding – as a 
means to its ends. It is for this reason that the state treats people 
as cogs,43 analysable quanta. It is for this reason that the state is 
something mechanical. Thus from the perspective of the abstract 
understanding the members of the body politic must be 
considered in abstraction from all their concrete particularity, as 
mere singular units or bare particulars, which can be brought into 
causal and mechanical relations so as to achieve the sovereign’s 
ends. Verstand applied to the social results in instrumental and 
mechanical relations. It operates in the spirit of positivity.  
 
This notion of Verstand can be considered as a cognitive mode 
that achieves clarity without depth to produce clear analysis. It 
fixes and isolates its objects and is associated with concepts as 
they are traditionally understood, as opposed to the Hegelian 
concept. Verstand creates rational and abstract theoretical 
structures, to quote Hegel, ‘a palace of the intellect where 
ordinary folk cannot dwell.’44 Whilst this may be fitting in some 
spheres, like science, in the social realm it only produces ‘a 
sapless phlegm that cripples free movement.’45  Such structures 
are the product of what Hegel refers to as the 
Buchstabenmench,46 the philosophers of the letter whose 
analytic clarity and rational structures become a source of 
‘vainglorious superiority.’47   
 
Legality is not, however, the enemy of ethical society, as it can 
become its instrument. Hence, the state must be subordinate to 
the moral person of the ethical society. The state, qua machine, 
must never be an ends and only ever a means. Abstract 
                                                
43 Hegel, Systemprogramme, op cit, 510. 
44 Harris, Hegel’s Development, op cit, 140.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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understanding must serve reason, or to use another idiom, 
Verstand serves Vernuft. Vernuft (reason) is for Hegel a mode of 
thought transcending the abstract quality of the understanding 
exposing its inner contradictions so that understanding’s 
conceptual clarity collapses, but collapses with a positive result, 
something higher.48  In politics that something higher is the moral 
person of ethical society. Anarchism is thus mitigated. When 
Verstand serves Vernuft, the state serves the ethical life of the 
people. The machine is a means of the people’s ends; the 
humanly constructed mechanism of state is a subordinate 
function of a republic bound in reciprocal connectedness. The 
Buchstabenmench, the philosophers of the letter, become the 
under-labourers of republican freedom, constructing theoretical 
structures in the service of society. 
 
In this critique of the Buchstaben philosophen the text arrives at 
a novel conception of the philosophical vocation. The 
philosopher becomes the Volkserzieher, teacher of the people; 
the philosopher’s vocation is not mere theoretical speculation but 
the practical realisation of that speculation in service to the 
people. The Volkserzieher seeks to enlighten the people and 
bring them beyond the state, beyond the subordination of 
freedom to its own mechanistic product, through awakening the 
spirit of reciprocal connectedness.49  Such enlightenment cannot 
be pursued purely through the Ideas of reason, which, whilst 
capable of motivating a philosophical temperament accustomed 
to abstraction, lacks the power to inspire the people. The people 
are capable of reaching the standpoint of enlightenment; this is 
simply the actualisation of human potential. Enlightenment is part 
of the actualisation of the concept of humanity, but the people 
need to be educated, enlightenment must be cultivated; this is 
the role of the Volkserzieher.50   
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The idea of the organic state, unified in the spirit of reciprocal 
connectedness, is an idea of reason. In order for that idea to 
pass over into the realm of popular political action, it must be 
rendered sensuous. It must be rendered in a form that appeals to 
the imagination.51  The people must undergo a sensuous 
experience with this idea. Otherwise, the idea will remain in the 
realm of abstract theory. For conservative thinkers these ideas of 
reason could never serve as motivation for political action, since 
the people simply are not moved by reason – indeed for the 
conservative the people are irrational. Reason is an abstract 
power; it is one that undermines tradition and so one cannot 
marry reason to the sensuous world of tradition. This idea is 
denied in the Systemprogramme. 
 
Something like Rousseau’s notion of the civic religion now 
comes into play. The Systemprogramme invokes the notion of a 
rational religion, through the notion of a mythology of reason. For 
Hegel, as for Rousseau, it seems as if a rational civil religion 
must derive its source of unity from something other than 
doctrines or creeds, for in the world of civic life there must be a 
perfect tolerance, without which social stability would falter.52 
Hence Hegel appeals to the imagistic and poetic power of myth 
rather than the rational theology of religion traditionally 
conceived, which, like pure reason itself, is too abstract to appeal 
to a people who have not yet undergone enlightenment. There 
are two core aims that a civic mythology must achieve: Firstly, 
the requirements of practical reason must be met within it. It 
must embody practical reason, practical reason must be its full 
content.53 Secondly, imagination, passion and sensibility must be 
fulfilled by it.54 It must render pure reason sensible. It must take 
an aesthetic form. The mythology of reason strives towards 
these ends, to create a unity of reason, imagination and passion 
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that could unify public life.55  It overcomes the gap between 
theory and practice by presenting a poetic expression of reason 
that appeals to popular imagination and passion. Through such a 
poetic expression of reason, the people can have a sensuous 
presentation of the ideas. They undergo a personal experience 
with practical reason and this, for the Hegel of the 
Systemprogramme, becomes the great vehicle of civic 
enlightenment.  
 
The highest act of reason is not the formulation of the Ideas of 
reason but rather the aesthetic act of poetising them; only 
through their poetisation can the Ideas of reason become a force 
of popular political action. The philosopher must have the 
aesthetic power of a poet56 for without this capacity reason must 
remain an abstraction. The Volkserzeiher is not the Buchstaben 
philosophen,57 the philosopher of the letter, philosophising from 
the standpoint of abstract understanding, but rather assumes the 
standpoint of an aestheticised reason. In making this claim the 
young Hegel undergoes a revolution in his understanding of the 
human condition and the relationship between reason and 
imagination.58  He saw his own vocation as that of a teacher of 
the people, and indeed he sees this as the most worthy vocation 
of all. Now, he is struck by the thought that without aesthetic 
sense one cannot achieve this vocation. Indeed one cannot even 
be a philosopher without aesthetic sense. A triangle forms: one 
can neither philosophise nor be a teacher of the people without 
aesthetic sense and one cannot be a teacher of the people 
without being a philosopher. Thus poetry acquires a higher 
dignity, becoming once again what it was in the beginning, in the 
world of Greek myth: the teacher of humanity.59 In the final act of 
reason, philosophy disappears into poetry.  
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The myth of reason, like the civil religion, serves the ideal of 
ethical society. Hegel is aware that such an idea may seem 
reactionary but claims 
 
 Before we make the Ideas aesthetic, ie mythological, they 
 are of no interest to the people and on the other  hand before 
 mythology is reasonable the philosopher must be ashamed of 
 it. Thus enlightened and unenlightened must finally shake 
 hands, mythology must become philosophical and the people 
 reasonable, and philosophy must become mythological in order 
 to make the philosophers sensuous. Then eternal unity will 
 reign among us. Never the despising gaze, never the blind 
 trembling of the people before its wise men and priests…then 
 general freedom and equality of spirits will reign…it will be the 
 last, greatest work of mankind.60 
 
Rational religion, as with Rousseau, overcomes the gap between 
theory and practice, becoming the vehicle of reciprocal 
connectedness, reconciling freedom and obligation.  
 
One must not overemphasise religion here. The Idea of beauty, 
not the Idea of the holy, is the pinnacle of reason. The highest 
rational act is an aesthetic act, not a holy one, beauty is the 
source of unity and reconciliation.61 Here religion and philosophy 
are on par, subsumed under beauty. When  reason is poetised, it 
takes the place of religion, and when reason is poetised, there 
will be no need to distinguish between religion, philosophy and 
poetry. Mythology becomes the proper name for the general 
integration of philosophy and aesthetic experience.62 This, rather 
than the completion of philosophy, the completion of science, 
becomes the last great work of humanity, rendering what has 
been completed by the intellect into a sensuous force in practical 
life.  
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Here art’s function is educative: it is humanity’s teacher and 
remains so even when philosophy consumes itself. The 
intellectual endeavour of philosophy, science itself, may 
complete itself, but until it is rendered poetic it has not realised its 
end. Philosophy thus has mythology as its limit for it is not the 
abstract speculation of the Buchstabenmench that is the greatest 
work of humanity. Rather, the poetization of pure speculation 
receives that accolade. Poetry lives on after speculation has 
ended. To marry a completed philosophy to poetry is to allow 
philosophy to pass over into poetry. The myth of reason remains 
as a religion of sorts, and it keeps the people on the moral path 
by its sensuous expression, but serves the further useful function 
of keeping philosophers sensuous by transforming them into 
poets. Thus theory is anchored in the sensuous world of practice 
and the people are spared the humiliation of the despising gaze 
of vainglorious wise men, and spared from the degradation of 
trembling before them. In the rational mythology philosophy and 
religion have passed over into art, the result of which is the 
utopian but beautiful dream of perfect equality and freedom. 
 
 
 
